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Abstract
Background: An old debate has undergone a resurgence in systems biology: that of reductionism versus holism.A t
least 35 articles in the systems biology literature since 2003 have touched on this issue. The histories of holism and
reductionism in the philosophy of biology are reviewed, and the current debate in systems biology is placed in
context.
Results: Inter-theoretic reductionism in the strict sense envisaged by its creators from the 1930s to the 1960s is
largely impractical in biology, and was effectively abandoned by the early 1970s in favour of a more piecemeal
approach using individual reductive explanations. Classical holism was a stillborn theory of the 1920s, but the term
survived in several fields as a loose umbrella designation for various kinds of anti-reductionism which often differ
markedly. Several of these different anti-reductionisms are on display in the holistic rhetoric of the recent systems
biology literature. This debate also coincides with a time when interesting arguments are being proposed within
the philosophy of biology for a new kind of reductionism.
Conclusions: Engaging more deeply with these issues should sharpen our ideas concerning the philosophy of
systems biology and its future best methodology. As with previous decisive moments in the history of biology,
only those theories that immediately suggest relatively easy experiments will be winners.
Introduction
An old debate has made a surprising, or perhaps not so
surprising, reappearance in systems biology: that of
reductionism versus holism. Surprising: in the sense that
the mainstream of molecular biology has for at least 30
years been relatively uninterested in the matter, content
with a compromise that allows lab work to proceed
without too much philosophical agonizing. Unsurprising:
in that general systems theory has churned with the
debate for nearly 75 years. Once systems theory met
molecular biology, it was probably only a matter of time
before the controversy went pandemic. At least 35 arti-
cles in the systems biology literature from 2003 to the
early part of 2009 touched on this issue [1-35]. How-
ever, much confusion is apparent in the variation in
what is understood by the term holistic,a n da l s of r o m
overstatements as to the degree that “traditional” mole-
cular biology is truly reductionist. Some of the systems
biology articles give the impression that this is the first
time this argument has arisen, but we have been here
before on several occasions.T h er e d u c t i o n i s t - h o l i s t
debate emerged in biology in the 1920s out of the ear-
lier disputes between mechanists and vitalists,a n d
between neo-Darwinians and neo-Lamarckians, although
it should not be thought that all the corresponding
terms on the left or right sides of each pair are in any
way necessarily equivalent. One would not expect any
aspiring modern holist within the systems biology com-
munity to be a vitalist or a neo-Lamarckian. Neverthe-
less, broadly speaking, it is possible to see general
continuities that allow one to posit what might be called
mechanist-Darwinian-reductionist and vitalist-Lamarck-
ian-holist lineages, respectively, and an understanding of
how these debates unfolded serves to illuminate how
any modern reductionist-holist conversation within sys-
tems biology may develop. Those systems biologists who
s e et h e m s e l v e sa sh o l i s t sneed to know what kind of
holists they are. Then they can be more explicit about
what aspects of reductionism they are opposed to. Many
holistically inclined systems biologists seem to be
arguing against a classical and now rather outdated
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really implemented in molecular biology, and are appar-
ently unaware of the new developments in the philosophy
of biology, what one might call the neo-reductionism, of
the last 20 years. Bringing systems biology face to face
w i t ht h el a t e s tv e r s i o n so fr e d u c t i o n i s ms h o u l db et h e
next step in the process. First, some of the previous
rounds in the contest are reviewed.
The Death of Vitalism
Vitalism is the belief that some special life-force (the
hormic schema, sentiment intérieur, élan vital or entele-
chy depending on the author) is necessary to differenti-
ate the living from the inanimate. For vitalists, no
matter how much detail is understood about the physi-
cal and mechanistic nature of living things, no matter
how much was known in the 19
th and early 20
th centu-
ries about their anatomy, physiology and biochemistry,
or since the mid-20
th century about their molecular
biology and genetics, this knowledge can never explain
why they are alive. This, of course, is a position with
very deep religious roots. Reference to vital spirits as
animatory factors in living matter was current among
the biologists of the 17
th century, and there was an
active anti-mechanistic movement among the group of
17
th century philosophers and liberal theologians known
as the Cambridge Platonists [36], although vitalism was
only first coined as a phrase by Paul-Joseph Barthez as
late as 1778 [37].
Just as vitalism had deep theological roots, its great
rival mechanism was the product of many centuries of
practical problem solving with engineering devices, long
predating science, but the integration of the device-
centred world of the artist-engineer with the mathema-
tico-theoretical one of the scientist-scholar was not
commonplace until the time of Kepler and Galileo in
t h el a t e1 6
th and early 17
th centuries [36]. Modern wri-
ters often point to Galileo’s younger contemporary René
Descartes as the man who first synthesized these influ-
ences into a mechanistic theory of biology, although
Cartesian specialists are often unsure if Descartes can
really be interpreted in that way [38]. However, many of
Descartes’s followers certainly held this view - the title
of Julian Offray de La Mettrie’s L’Homme Machine of
1748 speaks for itself.
The philosophical basis for vitalism in its most recent
form is often taken to be the work of Henri Bergson
[39], and its last great scientific exponent was the
embryologist Hans Driesch [40]. Driesch’s work is still
often studied at second-hand today by way of contrast
with his mechanist rival Wilhelm Roux, who together
with Driesch virtually created the modern experimental
science of developmental biology out of the descriptive
embryological anatomy of the 19
th century. Roux was
more a laboratory man than a philosopher, so the main
defence of the principles of mechanism, that all living
processes “can be unequivocally explained in physico-
chemical terms” [quoted in [41], p.430] fell to Jacques
Loeb [42]. That Loeb was a biochemist, rather than a
developmental biologist like Roux, was no accident,
since the discovery of cell-free fermentation by Eduard
Buchner in 1897 is regarded as both one of the founda-
tions of modern biochemistry and also a major experi-
mental nail in the coffin of vitalism. By the 1920s,
vitalism had been almost completely abandoned, not
just because it had failed to convince practising biolo-
gists on a theoretical level but also on account of its
inability to provide a basis for any experimental research
programme, despite some interesting efforts in embryol-
ogy by Driesch. Mechanism, by contrast, suggested
numerous avenues of experimental analysis. Vitalism in
its death throes was largely constituted as a denial of
the possibilities of progress in understanding biological
systems through mechanistic methods and this was a
difficult position to hold when experimental progress
was so obvious. Mechanism won the philosophical
debate, as far as any philosophical debate can ever be
said to be won, but more importantly for everyday
science, it won on the practical level.
In the aftermath of Darwin’s triumphant bicentenary,
it is easy to forget that his centenary year and the two
decades following it were difficult times for Darwinians.
The problems of reconciling Darwin’s gradualist view of
evolution with the saltationist or macro-mutationist
views common among the early Mendelian geneticists
had given rise to a climate where the theories of Dar-
win’s predecessor Lamarck, or a mutated form of them
known as neo-Lamarckism which emphasised the inheri-
tance of traits developed during the lifetime of the
organism through interaction with its environment,
were once again resurgent. Evolution in the Light of
Modern Knowledge [43], a multi-author volume pub-
lished in 1925 and typical of its time, contains neo-
Lamarckian contributions from psychologist Conwy
Lloyd Morgan, botanist E.O. Bower and zoologist Ernest
MacBride, all leading representatives of their disciplines.
There is not a single article that is recognizably Darwinian
to modern eyes, and the only references to Darwin are
attempts to co-opt Darwin’s later theories as a kind of
early neo-Lamarckism. Lloyd Morgan retains a lasting
influence within the reductionist-holist debate via his
development of the antireductionist concept of emergent
evolution, still used today [44]. However, just as the
mechanists had gained the upper hand over the vitalists by
a combination of theoretical and practical advantages, so
did this final flowering of Lamarckism perish at the hands
of neo-Darwinism by the 1930s. The neo-Darwinian
synthesis, pioneered by R.A. Fisher and others, had
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liation of Mendelian genetics with evolutionary gradual-
ism, whereas the neo-Lamarckians remained unsure how
to integrate Lamarck with Mendel. MacBride, for instance,
thought Mendelian genetics to be of no evolutionary rele-
vance. Neo-Darwinism also had the experimental advan-
tage of proposing an immense raft of relatively quick and
simple experiments, which soon became the basis of the
disciplines of ecological and population genetics. The
experiments of Lamarckism, by contrast, often involving
behavioural or anatomical manipulations on laboratory
animals, were long, laborious and difficult to interpret
conclusively, as in the famous case of Paul Kammerer’s
midwife toads [45]. Since the last of the vitalists also
tended to be neo-Lamarckians in their evolutionary the-
ories, the defeat of Lamarckism was also the final straw for
what remained of vitalism. Once again, the victory was
won in the laboratory rather than in the theoretician’s
study.
The Short Life of Classical Holism and the Birth of
Inter-Theoretic Reductionism
It was into this environment that Jan Smuts first
launched his concept of holism [46]. From the Greek
õloζ (a whole), Smuts’ wholes were the basis of a philo-
sophy not dissimilar to Lloyd Morgan’s emergent evolu-
tion. For Smuts, the entire universe was based on an
innate tendency for stable wholes to form from parts.
This tendency was taken to occur at all levels from the
atomic through the biological to the psychological.
Whereas the élan vital of the vitalists was simply a fac-
tor that operated in living things to differentiate the ani-
mate from the inanimate, Smuts’ vera causa operated in
all matter, driving evolution ever upwards to larger and
more complex new levels. As in the anti-Darwinian
orthogenetic theories of evolution, the first of which was
advanced by St. George Jackson Mivart in the 19
th cen-
tury [47, pp.55-56], an upward, diversifying force is
inherent in the material in question rather than being a
consequence of the mechanistic interaction of parts, but
Smuts wanted his principle to apply to the entire uni-
verse and not just biological organisms. “All the pro-
blems of the universe, not only those of matter and life,
but also and especially those of mind and personality,
which determine human nature and destiny, can in the
last resort only be resolved - in so far as they are
humanly soluble - by reference to the fundamental con-
cept of Holism” [[46], pp. 320-321]. Not far removed
from the panpsychism of the 17
th century philosopher
Spinoza, which also advocated purposive properties in
all matter, Smuts’s holism can therefore be seen to be
an attempt to salvage something from the debris of the
vitalist-Lamarckian wreckage. Like his neo-Lamarckian
biologist contemporary Ernest MacBride, Smuts did not
regard Mendelian genetics as having any evolutionary
importance, and his orthogenetic theory of evolution
also relegated natural selection to a subsidiary role.
Within ten years of the publication of Smuts’ book, his
theory was effectively obsolete in biology. Nevertheless,
the term holism lived on and began to resurface in
debates rather distant from the metaphysical questions
with which Smuts had concerned himself.
Throughout his writing, it is clear that Smuts,
although not strictly a vitalist, saw his main enemy as
mechanism, rather than reductionism. The reductionist-
holist dichotomy had to wait until reductionism was
itself mature. Some modern authors have traced reduc-
tionism, like mechanism, back to Descartes [48,49] or
even to ancient Greece [50,51], but its most ambitious
modern form only dates from Smuts’s contemporaries,
the Wiener Kreis or Vienna Circle, a group of philoso-
phers first organized in 1922, although some of the
members had been associated before the First World
War. The Vienna Circle adhered to positivism, a system
that originated in the work of 19
th century philosopher
Auguste Comte, and which was characterised by rejec-
tion of metaphysics and insistence on empirical data as
the only true foundation of knowledge. Naturally, this
led them to reject vitalism and embrace the mechanism
of the experimentalists, attempting to construct a frame-
work for a unified science built hierarchically on the
foundations of physics: “t h ew h o l eo fS c i e n c eb e c o m e s
Physics... every scientific statement can be interpreted, in
principle, as a physical statement” (capitals and italics in
original) [[52], pp. 98-99], or as Thomas Nagel has
expressed it: “Reductionism is the idea... that physics is
the theory of everything” [[51], p.3] To this end, the
Vienna Circle developed a rigorous method, using the
grammar of mathematical logic, for the reduction of
higher-level theories to more fundamental ones: the pro-
cess of inter-theoretic reduction. Once reduced, the
higher-level theory then becomes essentially unneces-
sary, except possibly as a kind of shorthand. Often
referred to as layered-model reductionism by modern
philosophers of science, this theory envisaged chemistry
as based on physics, biology based on chemistry, and
the human sciences (psychology, sociology etc) as based
on biology. The Vienna Circle was broken up by the
rise of the Nazis, and their other ideas on the philoso-
phy of science were largely superseded by those of Karl
Popper (they were verificationists whereas Popper was a
falsificationist) who, thanks to the efforts of Peter Meda-
war [53,54] among others, became the mascot philoso-
pher of molecular biology. Nevertheless, inter-theoretic
reduction achieved its mature form in the early 1960s in
the work of the Vienna Circle’s disciples such as Ernest
Nagel [41], and its logical form can be summarised as
follows [55]:
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then
a) all laws of T’ must be derivable from T
b) all the theoretical vocabulary of T’ must be re-
expressible in terms of T
So for instance, the term temperature of a gas in ther-
modynamics would be reducible to mean kinetic energy
of the gas molecules in statistical mechanics and gas
pressure would be reducible to mean molecular density
of the gas molecules. By a steady accumulation of equiv-
alences of this sort, thermodynamics would eventually
be reduced to statistical mechanics. The vocabulary of
thermodynamics would then become a kind of short-
hand for concepts that could be expressed more com-
pletely, if rather more verbosely, in the language of
statistical mechanics. Likewise, any reduction of Mende-
lian genetics to molecular biology would require
re-expression of the terms of the former into those of
the latter. Gene might thus be re-expressed as stretch of
DNA coding for a protein or functional RNA along with
contiguous regulatory DNA,a n ds oo n .O fc o u r s e ,t h e r e
is considerable room for manoeuvre in this kind of defi-
nition: anyone who has been an undergraduate in genet-
ics or molecular biology since the 1970s will be familiar
with the workhorse examination question, “What is a
gene?” Generations of students are thereby invited to do
a little inter-theoretic reduction in the spirit of the
Vienna Circle. Examinations aside, little attempt was
actually made to apply this framework to real cases
within the biological sciences but, due to popularizations
by Francis Crick ("The ultimate aim of the modern
movement in biology is in fact to explain all biology in
terms of physics and chemistry” [[56], p.10, italics in ori-
ginal]) and Jacques Monod [50] in the 1960s and 1970s,
it became taken for granted within molecular biology.
Like Richard Dawkins’“ unbelieving Anglicans” [57],
molecular biologists had a philosophy they could com-
fortably pretend to agree o n ,t h a tp r o v i d e da ni d e a l
towards which they could reasonably strive, without any
interference in the basics of decent daily activity.
Even assuming that both aspects of the inter-theoretic
reduction were completed, with adequate re-expression
of both vocabulary and laws, the completed reduction is
still vulnerable to change in either or both of the
reduced and reducing theories. If some aspect of biology
is regarded as reduced to physics or at least chemistry,
the assumption is made that the underlying chemistry is
correct. Should the relevant parts of chemistry be dis-
proved, the reductional chain will be broken, and the
biology will require to be re-reduced to the new physics
or chemistry. Previous satisfactory reductions may sud-
d e n l yb e c o m ei n v a l i di nt h is way, and reduction must
always therefore be considered to be provisional. How-
ever, just as a previous reductive chain may be broken
by changes in the underlying theory, so may reduction
become possible where before it was not [58,59]. Anti-
reductionist declarations must always be provisional too.
Ernest Nagel interestingly points out that chemistry is
only reducible to post-1925 physics, and thermody-
namics is only reducible to post-1866 statistical
mechanics. In both cases it was advances in the redu-
cing theory that enabled the reduction [60].
Modern Holism: 1) Epistemological
Antireductionism
Meanwhile, despite the failure of Smuts to find any dis-
ciples among practising biologists, his label of holism
was adopted by those opposed, for often quite divergent
reasons, to the advance of reductionism [48,61-65].
Some of the post-war holists saw reductionism as a
rather brutalizing tendency to describe all complex phe-
nomena as “nothing but” the interaction of molecules,
which they ridiculed as nothing-buttery [66]. The psy-
chologist Abraham Maslow apparently even considered
ar e d u c t i o n i s ta t t i t u d et ob eam i l df o r mo fp s y c h o -
neurosis [quoted in [67], p.7]. Reductionists in return
accused holists of morethanism, an allegedly emotional
insistence that complex phenomena are necessarily
“more than” the sum of their parts. More recently an
intermediate position has developed, which believes in
the essential value of reductionism but decries its exces-
sive implementation as the sin of greedy reductionism.
By the same token, it is also possible to be a greedy hol-
ist [68].
However, descriptions of these disputes often make
the assumption that each of these parties represents an
agreed philosophical position, which is rarely the case.
Thomas Nagel has presented a taxonomy of modern
anti-reductionism(s), which he divided in the first
instance into two kinds: epistemological and ontological
[51]. Epistemology being the branch of philosophy deal-
ing with what can be known and how we know it, epis-
temological antireductionism is the recognition that
some phenomena are too complex to be comprehended
by human, or even computer, intelligence. Nagel’s exam-
ples include a performance by a pianist - a description
of every event in the performance at the quantum physi-
cal level, or possibly even at the muscular physiological
level, would be overwhelmingly complex. The epistemo-
logical antireductionist is a holist because complete
reductionism is technically impossible. For a systems
biologist, sheer complexity, one might say irreducible
complexity [13,69], can prevent the exhaustive analysis
of a network of any interesting size. Quite how limiting
our epistemological shortcomings can be is not fully
appreciated, especially by those who advocate a
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thing” is known [70]. To take a simple example,
“Moore’sL a w ” [71] observes that available processing
power doubles every 2 years or so, and beyond the phy-
sical limits of present processors there is the promise of
quantum computing. The “ultimate laptop”, a quantum
computing machine of approximate size and weight to a
modern laptop performing at physically possible limits
[72], would run at 10
51 FLOPS (c.f. 10
10 FLOPS for a
current processor), based on the maximum information
carrying capacity of 1 kg of matter, known as “Bremer-
mann’sL i m i t ” [73]. 10
40 FLOPS will be the effective
ultimate limit, for various technical reasons. This kind
of mind-boggling computing power, possibly or even
probably available within the next century, is the basis
of singularitarian confidence. However, the biological
systems are even more mind-boggling in their complex-
ity. For instance, 193 genes are known to be involved in
spore formation and degradation in Bacillus [74]. If we
wish to make a start on simulation of the contribution
of these 193 genes to the final phenotype, we might
represent this network as 193 binary nodes, in the sim-
plest possible star topology, i.e. all genes are either on
or off and all have an equal weight in determining the
state of the pathway and there are no interactions
between genes. This is of course already a considerable
simplification for the sake of easier modelling. An
exhaustive exploration of such a state space of 193
inputs requires 2
193 or about 10
58 operations. A current
processor requires about 10
48 seconds for this, or about
4×1 0
40 years. The ultimate laptop manages in just
under 4 × 10
10 years, or slightly under 3 times the age
of the universe. It is therefore clear that even this sim-
plified 193 node model will never be fully computed on
a single processor. Parallelisation has often been held up
as a solution to such combinatorial explosions. If one
were to construct an ultimate grid of ultimate laptops,
the current limit would be 10
12 nodes, for various tech-
nical reasons. This would bring the total time down to
practical levels, although the sheer energy demands of
the system might present other restrictions. One alter-
native is simply to study only tractable problems. On a
single current 10
10 F L O P Sp r o c e s s o ro v e ro n em o n t h ,
one could exhaustively explore a state space of 2.7 ×
10
16 possibilities. A binary star-topology network of 54
genes is thus at the limit of brute force tractability. Even
with the ultimate laptop, the corresponding figure is 154
genes. It is a sobering thought that a transition from
present day computing capacity to ultimate computing
capacity will only increase the tractable size of a binary
star network by a mere 3-fold [69].
Expressions of antireductionism in one of systems
biology’s precursors, the classic systems theory litera-
ture, are also often of this epistemological kind. Ervin
László, for instance, uses an example of understanding
traffic accidents on the 4
th of July [75]. At the level of
the individual drivers and cars (which is not even at the
physical level), there would be many millions of data
points, and complete uncertainty about how to use the
various driver abilities, journey times and lengths, vehi-
cle brake qualities and so on to derive a prediction of
the number of accidents on any particular 4
th of July. A
better understanding might be achieved by accessing
statistics on previous accident blackspots, the weather in
these locations and the alcohol consumption of drivers
during the day. László does not deny the principle of
reductionism, but merely questions its feasibility and
usefulness. This is the mildest form of holism, but
among the prominent holists of the postwar era many
go beyond the epistemological argument and adopt
ontological antireductionism.
Modern Holism: 2) Ontological Antireductionisms,
Constitutive and Explanatory
Nagel’s second category is ontological antireductionism.
Ontology, the study of what objects exist, or what is
correctly defined as an object for study, is more familiar
term for biologists, having become incorporated exten-
sively into systems biology and bioinformatics. Ontologi-
cal antireductionism is the argument that there are
certain things, entities or laws, that reductionism can
never capture, even if we transcended the epistemologi-
cal limitations. Regardless of any hypothetical complete
description of the pianist’s performance it would fail to
answer some questions one might have about the per-
formance. Likewise, the ontological antireductionist
would maintain that even if we could transcend Bremer-
mann’s Limit and derive a complete description of our
irreducibly complex network, there would still be things
that would remain unknown about it. Nagel then divides
ontological antireductionism into two kinds, constitutive
and descriptive, which give different reasons for this fail-
ure. Constitutive ontological antireductionism declares
that there are fundamental things involved in the pia-
nist’s performance other than the particles described in
the complete quantum mechanical description. One
might insist that there would be some spiritual or musi-
cal aspect of the pianist’s performance that could never
be explained by the reduction to physiology or physics.
Whatever the merits of such an argument in music the-
ory, in our systems biology network example this would
be tantamount to vitalism, and so can be effectively
neglected.
Explanatory ontological antireductionism,b yc o n t r a s t ,
accepts that the physical description of the pianist’s per-
formance is the full description, but holds that there are
emergent laws pertaining to that description that are
not derivable from the laws governing the ultimate
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are not captured at the physical level. There is usually
the implicit assumption that such emergent laws are in
principle non-reducible, not that we merely fail to
reduce them based on our current knowledge. Nagel’s
example of how such an emergent law could arise
requires us to differentiate between physical states or
events and facts about the world. One might acknowl-
edge that every physical event has an explanation in
terms of physics, but that a fact can have many physical
descriptions that satisfy it. In the piano recital example,
there are innumerable physical descriptions that would
fit the pianist striking a certain key at a certain time. It
is therefore wrong to insist that a higher level fact
reduces to a physical explanation, as many physical
explanations would be compatible with it. As macro-
states of a system correspond to numerous micro-states,
there is a certain buffering against changes at the micro-
level. This has been termed variostability [76], order
above inhomogeneity [77] or cohesion [78], and under
such circumstances reduction may be deemed to be
both “pointless and misleading” [78]. Likewise, given
this apparent freedom of the higher-level property from
total dependence on lower-level properties, higher-level
laws are not derivable from lower level laws. Walter
Elsasser coined the term biotonic laws for such laws
applicable to biology which were compatible with the
laws of physics, but not deducible from them [79].
Under such circumstance, ontological antireductionists
often suggest that the higher-level systems may start to
exert an effect on the lower level ones, a top-down cau-
sation or macrodeterminism [63,80] that reverses the
usual bottom-up causation of the reductionist. Michael
Polanyi extended antireductionism beyond biology to
any complex objects such as motor cars [[81], pp. 124-
142]. For Polanyi, both biological organisms and
mechanisms of human construction work in accordance
with physical laws but this does not therefore mean that
they are fully comprehensible in terms of them. Polanyi
stressed that organisms, and indeed complex mechanical
objects like motor cars, have pathologies in the way that
inanimate open systems, such as thunderstorms, do not.
This is not an argument about complexity; the thunder-
storm is itself highly complex, indeed chaotic in the for-
mal mathematical sense. There are many ways that an
organism can go wrong, can be sick, fail to eat, defend
itself, reproduce or even die. Likewise, a motor car can
break down or fail to start. By contrast hydrochloric
acid can never fail to dissolve zinc, and a thunderstorm
can never fail to shed large quantities of rain. Polanyi
used the word achievement to describe this property.
We have to consider organisms as achieving or failing in
certain goals, otherwise we cannot comprehend what
organisms are doing at any time. Polanyi is often
regarded as being as antireductionist as it is possible to
be, but his concept of pathologies in biological and
mechanical devices is a strong argument for mechanism.
Organisms and mechanisms are differentiated from
chaotic natural systems like thunderstorms. Claiming
that mechanisms are simplistic organisms is merely the
converse of the standard mechanistic argument that
organisms are just highly complex mechanisms.
A Bestiary of Holisms in System Biology
While these discussions were ongoing, practical molecu-
lar biology carried on regardless for some 50 years, rea-
sonably comfortable in its tentative reductionism.
Experimental success caused holistic objections to fade
away. Single gene analyses gradually shifted towards
large mutational screens and complete genome maps,
then to whole genome sequences and exhaustive geno-
mics and proteomics expression data. Almost imper-
ceptibly, systems biology emerged out of traditional
molecular biology, and with this shift the reductionism-
holism debate has resurfaced, with many recent bold
declarations that systems biology is a more holistic
approach to biology than traditional molecular biology
[15,16,23,28,30,34,35], or arguments that traditional
molecular biology represents a greedy reductionist
approach (to some authors a naïvely reductionist one)
that either requires extensive complementation from, or
maybe even replacement by, systems biology
[12,13,19,22,24,33]. In some cases, these comments have
come from research areas that already regard themselves
as more holistic than molecular biology and which iden-
tify a kindred spirit in systems biology. Examples include
ethnopharmacology [15] or Chinese traditional medicine
[16]. Some papers have emphasised top-down causation
as a property of systems [4,10,14,21,23,31]. Others
[1,20,21,23,29,31] have even suggested that systems biol-
ogy is the beginning of a paradigm shift, a fundamental
change in the way we do biology, comparable to past
paradigm shifts such as the 17th century transition from
Ptolemaic to Copernican astronomy or the early 20th
century transition from classical to modern physics [82],
or that we are witnessing the death of molecular biology
as we know it [32].
Not everybody has agreed. Some think that such
declarations of holism are wrong because systems biol-
ogy is actually not holistic enough [2,3,7,18,25] and so
far is really just old-fashioned molecular biology writ
large: “a euphemism for gathering ever more details on
an ever larger scale” [2]. A rather smaller group of dis-
senters take the opposite line entirely, disagreeing with
holism on principle, and arguing for an even more
reductionist approach [9,11]. For instance, it has been
argued, looking at systems biology from the perspective
of chemical process engineering, that systems biology
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data-poor in those quantitative, precise measurements
that are the most necessary for accurate network simu-
lation [11]. Others have expressed various degrees of
skepticism concerning the paradigm shift claims [26,83]
Nevertheless, nobody nowadays, at least in the systems
biology literature, is advocating the original holism of
Jan Smuts. Some authors, although enthusiastic about
the anti-reductionism they see in systems biology, find
that connotations with the work of Smuts make them
uneasy with the use of the term holism [23]. Its original
formulation having been dropped, it is not now entirely
clear what a modern holistic systems biology is or
would be. This is reflected in the variety of ways in
which the term is currently used. Some see it simply as
a change in emphasis in the size of the units of analysis -
if we are studying whole pathways rather than indivi-
dual genes, that must be (w)holism. Others see a pro-
blem of circularity in explanation - cellular systems
behaviour cannot be explained in terms of gene action
as the gene action is itself part of that system. These
kinds of holisms are really just general statements of
intent. Just as traditional molecular biologists were
reductionists without being sure of what reductionism
entailed, so are these systems biologists similarly holists
by declaration rather than practice. Where more detailed
arguments for holism occur in the systems biology litera-
ture, they are often ontological explanatory antireduc-
tionist [4,5,10,12,14,17,21,23,31], but it is also possible to
see some that are of the milder epistemological antire-
ductionist kind [9,28]. The choice of the word holism by
systems biologists, rather than any of its more common
modern synonyms organicism, emergentism or coherent-
ism, is itself intriguing but there does not appear to be
any obvious explanation. It may be that holism is largely
found within the theoretical biology literature, whereas
emergentism and coherentism are more used by philoso-
phers. Organicism perhaps implies the properties of
a whole organism which is not usually the level under
discussion in systems biology.
The Death of Inter-Theoretic Reductionism in
Biology
We may not know exactly what modern holism in sys-
tems biology is - although we can perhaps generalise
that it is usually explanatory ontological antireduction-
ism with some tendencies to epistemological antireduc-
tionism - but we do know that it is against
reductionism. That might be the end of the discussion,
were it not for the fact that it is not entirely clear if we
know what reductionism is either. Scientists can see
vaguely what it means to reduce biology to chemistry,
to say that biological phenomena are explicable in terms
of chemical reactions, and can often provide specific
and convincing examples, but doing inter-theory reduc-
tion in its rigorous form is very difficult in biology. Fol-
lowing on from the framework of Ernest Nagel
described above, in the late 1960s and early 1970s some
attempts were made by Kenneth Schaffner and David
Hull at an inter-theoretic reduction of Mendelian genet-
ics to molecular genetics, with mixed results [84,85]. For
instance, there is no term in molecular biology that can
capture everything that is implied by the term gene in
classical genetics. Molecular biologists know that genes
are made of DNA, but each gene is unique in terms of
how that DNA is constituted into that particular gene.
Reduction is challenging enough for objects in the two
theories but for processes, such as segregation or gene
silencing, the complexities are even greater. For
instance, Philip Kitcher has pointed out that the inde-
pendent assortment of genes at meiosis can be explained
simply in terms of a set of rules for moving objects.
Even if those objects are not actual chromosomes but
simulations, e.g. beanbags or graphic objects in a com-
puter simulation, the same rules would apply, and that
DNA-free explanation would be a fully adequate one
[86]. The same could be said of Darwin’s model of evo-
lution by Natural Selection, which as well as applying to
biological objects could also in theory (and perhaps in
fact, although that is disputed) apply to such things as
chemical or socio-cultural or software evolution -
Richard Dawkins’ Universal Darwinism [87]. Even if
there were no actual biological objects, the theory would
still make logical sense. In a systems biology context,
one might derive novel rules concerning a set of proper-
ties of a gene-regulatory or metabolic network. These
rules might turn out to have logical validity in other
contexts and different kinds of network, perhaps even in
non-biological networks. Of course in the real biological
world, Mendelian and Darwinian and metabolic systems
phenomena are instantiated in DNA, cells and organ-
isms, but these laws we use to describe their behaviour
are to this extent independent of their substrate, what
Paul Davies has called software laws rather than hard-
ware laws [88]. Reductionism does not so much fail
here as appear to be an unnecessary complication.
Genes are more than just DNA, ushering in the mor-
ethanism of explanatory ontological emergence.
Perhaps the attempted inter-theoretic reduction of
classical to molecular genetics by Schaffner and Hull
was too ambitious, in that it concerned the reduction of
an entire discipline, but even within narrower areas
results have been mixed. A 1998 survey of the progress
of reductionism in biology turned up two cases (muscle
contraction and the bacteriorhodopsin receptor) where
reduction of molecular biology to the level of chemistry
has been nearly achieved to the satisfaction of the inves-
tigators [89,90], as well as two other areas (hearing and
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made [91,92]. It should also be noted that the partici-
pants in the 1998 exercise were only describing how
they felt their areas of expertise could be reduced and
what their successes and failures had been. It should
also be noted that the reports of successful reductionism
were all below the molecular biological level, i.e. in the
reduction of molecular biology to chemistry and not
above it, i.e. in the reduction of cellular or organismic
biological areas to molecular biology. No attempt to
apply the full logical reductionist framework in the tra-
dition of the Vienna Circle was attempted, nor is it
probable that any practising scientist would have the
time or inclination to try. Nevertheless, traditional mole-
cular biologists, those who spend their careers exhaus-
tively analysing the functional and structural properties
of one or perhaps a handful of genes and/or proteins,
still tend to identify themselves as reductionists, perhaps
via the influence of reductionism’s advocates among the
founding fathers of the field or perhaps because their
organismic biologist colleagues have always assured
them that they are reductionists (and now systems biol-
ogists are doing it too). There may also seem to be
something suspicious in the abandonment of reduction-
ism. After all, if one ceases to believe that all science is
reducible to physics, this implies that physics is not a
completely full description of the world, which opens
the door to non-physical entities and inevitably to night-
mares of vitalism. One may become a temporary ontolo-
gical holist when enjoying a pianist’s performance, but it
is quite another thing to take such attitudes into the
laboratory. Reductionism as a vague doctrine exerts a
strong hold over those who would never dream of actu-
ally applying it to the full extent its creators envisaged.
In practise, however, whatever their avowed allegiances,
molecular biologists are rarely greedy reductionists.
Explanation of cellular phenomena is often attempted at
the level of gene action, and occasionally at the level of
a single mutation affecting the structure of a single pro-
tein, but further reduction of this to the level of quan-
tum chemistry is rarely attempted. Molecular biology’s
reductions are usually only to the level of macromole-
cules rather than to the atomic level [32]. For the most
part, holist-reductionist controversy does not enter very
much into traditional molecular biology except in cases
such as human behaviour or cognitive neuroscience
where the gap between the subject of study (DNA mole-
cules) and the level to be explained (human behaviour
and psychology), is very large. In most areas of molecu-
lar biology there has been little question that the study
of the expression and structure of individual genes was
the quickest way forward, and little appetite for any
further reduction beyond that level. Inter-theoretic
reduction may be dead but the biological principle of
reduction [84], a commitment to try to reduce wherever
possible, to create as many reductive explanations as
possible, even in the absence of complete reduction,
lives on.
If that were the end of the story, with vague holism
opposed to vague reductionism, then there would be
reasonable grounds for setting aside what one of the
more entertaining science bloggers recently called “the
same old boring stuff about reductionism and holism in
biology”. However, both a new reductionism and, some
would say, a new holism have begun to reveal
themselves.
New Kids on the Block: Neo-Reductionism and
Relational Biology
In fact, like the original “New Kids on the Block”,t h e s e
theories are by no means young any more. The new
reductionism has its roots in the failure of attempts at
inter-theoretic reduction in the early 1970s, and because
of this it might be justifiably termed a neo-reductionism
(by analogy with neo-conservatism). Faced with pro-
blems that appeared to leave an opening for explanatory
ontological holism, Kenneth Schaffner first retreated to
a form of piecemeal reductionism, the biological princi-
ple of reduction, advocating a plurality of efforts at dif-
ferent levels: “anatomy, neurology, genetics, and so on,
study the living organism in each discipline’so w n
terms” [84]. Even Francis Crick hedged his bets around
the same time: “The professional scientist will attack
wherever he can.... The point of attack is always a mat-
ter of tactics.” [56]. This stance lives on in today’sp r a g -
matic reductionism [93,94] and in advocates of inclusive
or multi-scale systems biology [11,95,96].
More radically, Schaffner split the reductive process
into two kinds: aggregative, which is part-to-part or
entity-to-entity (Schaffner initially held that “gene =
DNA” was one of these) and interactive,w h e r et h e
reducing theory does not rigidly predict the relationship
of the parts. This latter kind allows an acknowledgement
of the arguments such as those given by Philip Kitcher,
Paul Davies, Richard Dawkins and Michael Ruse con-
cerning the abstractness, the substrate independence, of
much biological theory, without abandoning the deter-
ministic relationship between micro-state and macro-
state. This concept was carried forward by Alexander
Rosenberg, who has argued that traditional reductionism
offered a hostage to fortune in the layered model. For
Rosenberg, the failure of inter-theoretic reduction is not
a failure of the reductive endeavour itself, but rather of
the arbitrary structure of theory relationship that it
unwisely attempted to explain. Rosenberg also rejects
epistemological antireductionist arguments, for instance
the irreducible complexity of large networks described
above. Far from being a singulitarian however,
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being merely trivially true, a fact about scientists and
computers rather than science [97]. In the place of the
layered model, Rosenberg flattens science to physics and
engineering [55,97]. Again this is by no means a com-
pletely novel argument, having been previously made by
J.J.C. Smart in the 1960s [98]. Smart argued what Rosen-
berg has called a provincialist thesis, that biology is just
a province of physics, a field where the laws of physics
are applied, but which has no laws of its own. Biologists
have scarcely been grateful over the years for this gener-
ous offer to relieve them of the burden of inter-theoretic
reduction, since it smacks of Rutherford’s alleged com-
ment that science is “only physics and stamp-collecting”
[99]. This argument is also something of a two-edged
sword for reductionists/provincialists since it has also
been used by their opponents. For instance, Giora Hon
[100] has made the absence of well-formed laws in biol-
ogy the basis of a call for the rethinking of the whole of
biology from first principles. Hon’sc o n c e p t i o no fan e w
biology is far from being a provincialist one, but rather
an autonomist one structured with new biotonic laws of
the type proposed by Walter Elsasser. The Rutherford-
Smart argument may free reductionism from the chains
of the layered theory model, but in downgrading biology
from science to engineering, it also frees holists from
the requirement to recognise that molecular biology has
achieved any worthwhile theoretical advances.
Rosenberg fortifies the Rutherford-Smart thesis by
stripping the layered model out of Schaffner’s interactive
reduction, and posits that the facts of biology are super-
venient on the facts of physics [97]. That is to say that
although the argument of the explanatory ontological
reductionists, that single biological macro-states do not
necessarily have single micro-states, is accepted, two sys-
tems with the same micro-state will of necessity have
the same macro-state. Just as in interactive reduction,
one cannot necessarily predict the macro-state from
the micro-state, but the macro-state is nevertheless
dependent on it - supervenient to it. Changes to the
micro-state may in certain circumstances, change the
supervenient macro-state, and if so that change will be
predictable. This is a subtle distinction, between predic-
tion of a complete macro-state ab initio from a given
micro-state and prediction of changes to a macro-state
given its micro-state and knowledge of previous changes
to the same micro-state in terms of macro-state. The
relationship between micro-state and macro-state will
never be simple, Rosenberg maintains, because Natural
Selection will favour any micro-state that happens to
correspond to a macro-state with selective advantage.
Traditional reductionism with its layered model of bio-
logical hierarchies (nucleotide, gene, organism, species,
ecosystem) and their corresponding hierarchies of theory
(chemistry, molecular biology, physiology, systematics,
ecology) made the assumption that real life was as neat
as the model. This could never be the case in an evolving
biosphere. Rosenberg’ss o l u t i o ni saDarwinian reduc-
tionism, mapping all macro-states back onto micro-
states, but recognizing that those micro-states are chaotic
and impossible to analyse. Because natural selection
works from highly heterogeneous material towards a
smaller number of functional ends, there are an immense
variety of physical structures that could be, for instance,
a wing. It is therefore pointless trying to reduce the
functional structures to molecular states.
Neo-reductionists also maintain that the concept of
top-down causation is a mirage. For instance, if a
macro-state M1 is supervenient on a micro-state m1,
top-down causation issuing from that macro-state M1
has its ultimate cause in the micro-state m1.A na d v o -
cate of top-down causation would argue that once the
higher-level property M1 h a sb e e na c h i e v e di ti sl e g i t i -
mate to say that it has certain effects, or can perform
certain functions, for instance it might create a new
micro-state m2. However, this is at best a shorthand for
saying that m1 causes m2 [101]. The reduction of M1
ceases to be a meaningful or worthwhile activity. Here,
there is no biological hierarchy and no hierarchy of the-
ories to distress the would-be reductionist. This is the
meaning of provincialism.
Although neo-reductionism has had a low profile
among systems biologists and biologists in general, a
new kind of holism, Relational Biology, has attracted
attention, mostly among those who are dissatisfied with
traditional molecular biology but also sceptical about
the explanatory capabilities of modern versions of hol-
ism [2,7,18]. Developed over some years by Robert
Rosen and a small band of disciples [102,103], relational
biology does not dispense with the hierarchy of the
Vienna Circle, but rather inverts it. Rosen, based on
some earlier similar ideas by Elsasser [104], claimed that
physics, by virtue of its application to homogeneous
molecular structure is in fact not the fundamental
science, but actually a special case. Biology, as the
science of the complex, is the lowest level in the layer
model. The idea that biology is a special case of physics,
i.e. that which applies to a special kind of matter - living
things - is in this view actually a residue from vitalism.
Rosen proposes that biology should be more about the
patterns of relations between things than the things
themselves. This idea has been independently developed
by many biologists, for instance in Richard Dawkins’
Universal Darwinism [87], and can be seen among net-
work theory practitioners in systems biology. Rosen,
however, goes somewhat further in arguing that when a
system contains a sufficient degree of internal feedback
loops, it can achieve a state of self-reference and become
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even relatively simple networks can be shown to be
non-computable. The challenge for modern systems
biologists, according to Rosen, is to develop new ways
of analysing such network structures.
Conclusions
Reductionism in biology belongs to the victorious
research tradition of mechanistic Darwinism. However,
technical inter-theory reduction has proved to be a far
more difficult process than its creators envisaged.
Reduction may be a valid endeavour, but its lack of gen-
eral applicability has meant that reduction-ism has con-
sequently faltered, and the underdog of holism has
emerged from its disreputable origins in vitalism and
Lamarckism. It is possible to see the vitalist-Lamarck-
ian-holist and mechanist-Darwinian-reductionist intel-
lectual lineages as competing Kuhnian paradigms [82],
but the picture of their interaction is more complex
than the basic paradigm shift model. From the 1850s to
the 1930s their influences waxed and waned over biol-
ogy, until the latter was finally triumphant in the 1930s.
There was no dramatic paradigm shift, since both had
considerable support and all working biologists would
have been familiar with them. Neither can be said to
have replaced the other, one merely died out as a ser-
ious explanatory framework. The difficulty of its experi-
ments and doubtfulness of its theory meant that vitalist-
Lamarckian-holism had become a degenerative research
programme [105]. However, these were not merely com-
peting theories - the choice of one or the other implied
profound choices about what kind of experiments could
be done and the rules by which they would be inter-
preted. They were genuinely competing paradigms. Calls
for a return to holism in systems biology are not calls
for a return to the holism of the 1930s, since that parti-
cular holism is no longer tenable. Modern holism, at
least in those cases where it is well defined, is part of
the current paradigm. The paradigm shift-spotters
[1,20,21,23,29,31] in systems biology are therefore at
least a little premature in their pronouncements.
The broadening of molecular biology into systems
biology has created a situation where researchers have a
vague inkling that their underlying philosophy is in need
of refurbishment, and holism appears to offer much of
what is wanted. Novice holists in systems biology should
not feel embarrassed by the vagueness of their convic-
tions; molecular biologists were for many years equally
vague about their reductionism. Holism, probably a mix-
ture of the explanatory ontological and epistemological
varieties may become the quasi-official philosophy of
systems biology with some new Francis Crick taking up
the role of chief cheerleader and everybody else just get-
ting on with the lab work. However, given the
opportunities for new ideas that arise in the early stages
of any new field, this easy adoption of some old philoso-
phy would be a disappointing outcome. There is scope
for original thought both within the traditional and
more recent concepts of reductionism and holism.
So what do we really mean when we speak of holism
in systems biology? If systems biologists regard holism
a ss i m p l yt h es t u d yo fl a r g e ru n i t s ,t h e ni ti ss i m p l ya
slogan, and it would be best to discard it before it cre-
ates divisions where none are necessary. That isn’t really
holism at all, as it fits perfectly within the traditional
hierarchical reductionist scheme. If by holism we mean
acknowledgement that irreducible complexity is always
going to get in the way of complete understanding and
if we are willing to approach that complexity by sacrifi-
cing total knowledge in favour of greater approximate
understanding, then that is epistemological antireduc-
tionism. This may be a new direction but it is within
what we might call the current paradigm and certainly
does not render traditional molecular biology obsolete.
If we go beyond mere complexity to an insistence on an
ontological antireductionismt h a tr e q u i r e st h ef o r m u l a -
tion of novel emergent or biotonic laws, then we are
still within the realms of the currently comprehensible.
After all, as the critics of reductionism have long
insisted, biology is full of examples of such things.
Whether such laws are non-reducible in principle or
merely in practice is a perilous prediction to make.
Since reductions are always provisional, the data can
surprise the anti-reductionists as much as it can the
reductionists.
Outside of the traditional reductionist framework, the
neo-reductionism of supervenience theory has so far
been relatively unapplied. Given that it purports to
escape from the traps of traditional reductionism by
scrapping hierarchical models of nature and the corre-
sponding layered models of scientific theory thereby
rendering traditional antireductionist critiques meaning-
less, systems biology would bea ni d e a lt e s t i n gg r o u n d
for its cogency. It would be a pity if the challenge were
not taken up. If Darwinian reductionism really does
transcend the old reductionist-holist dichotomy, systems
biology would be the ideal place to demonstrate it. Like-
wise, we are now in a position to test Rosen’st h e o r i e s
about non-computable network structures, and to
search for real biological examples of them. Just as
experimental programmes were essential to the victories
of mechanism in the 1910s and neo-Darwinism in the
1930s, only those theories that immediately suggest rela-
tively easy experiments will be winners.
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